คำแปลคำวินิจฉัยของศาลปกครองไทย
คำแปลคำวินิจฉัยของศาลปกครองไทย
The Legality of the Ministerial Regulation Prescribing Inappropriate Hairstyles and Attire for Students
The Plaintiffs were students of public schools aggrieved by the Defendant No. 2’s Regulation, which prescribed some hairstyles and the use of cosmetics as ‘inappropriate for students.’ They filed the case with the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting the revocation of the said rule. The Court held that even though the disputed Regulation was intended to foster good behavior, it did not take any changes in the social context and the development of children’s identities and personalities into consideration. Accordingly, it did not give primary importance to the best interests of the child, and thus contradicted the Child Protection Act, B.E. 2546 (2003). Furthermore, the Defendant No. 2 had issued a ministerial regulation pursuant to the Act, which empowered schools to set out their own rules on students’ behavior, including attire and hairstyles. Therefore, the disputed clause, issued under the Announcement of the Revolutionary Council, could not remain enforceable by virtue of the transitional provision of the said Act and was deemed to be revoked by the Child Protection Act, B.E. 2546 (2003). Ultimately, the aforementioned Regulation constituted an unreasonable restriction of the liberty over a person’s body, which was prohibited by the Constitution, and therefore was unenforceable.
อ่าน 14
อ่านรายละเอียด
A Harbour Master's order that conflicts with the Intent of the Law
The Navigation in the Thai Waters Act, B.E. 2456 (1913) was designed to regulate navigation in Thai waters, ensuring the safe and orderly use of public waterways and preventing actions that could obstruct or endanger navigation. While the Defendant No. 2 had the authority to issue orders under this Act, such orders needed to align with its intent. In this case, the Plaintiff initially built a house that encroached upon a public canal, obstructing navigation. In response, the Defendant No. 2 ordered the Plaintiff to remove the house, which the Plaintiff complied with. However, the Defendant No. 2 subsequently issued another order instructing the Plaintiff to restore the canal to its previous state. The Plaintiff challenged this second order, arguing that it was unlawful. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the order caused the canal to revert to a shallow state and altered its usability as a waterway, which was inconsistent with the intent of the Act. Therefore, the order was found to be an undue exercise of discretion, imposing an excessive burden on the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Court ruled that the order of the Defendant No. 2 was unlawful and revoked it.
อ่าน 61
อ่านรายละเอียด
The Legality of the Royal Pardon Decree
The Plaintiff was sentenced to death for committing an offense under Section 289 (4) of the Criminal Code. He had previously received the Royal Pardon twice. According to Section 13 (1) and (5) of the Royal Pardon Decree on the occasion of the Birthday Anniversary of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great, National day of the Kingdom of Thailand and Thai Father’s Day, B.E. 2563 (2020), the Plaintiff was not eligible for a Royal Pardon under this Decree. The Plaintiff argued that the said provisions were enacted in violation of legal principles and inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand regarding human dignity, rights, liberties, and equality of the people. The Plaintiff then filed a plaint with the Supreme Administrative Court, requesting the Court to revoke Section 13 (1) and (5) of the Royal Pardon Decree. The Supreme Administrative Court held that a Royal Decree issued by the King’s Royal Prerogative as the Head of State as stipulated in Section 179 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand is the exercise of Royal Prerogative power, which does not the exercise of administrative power as an administrative agency or a State official under Section 3 of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999) that falls within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court.
อ่าน 65
อ่านรายละเอียด
No constitutional right to bear arms—discretion on issuance of a firearm licence
Given that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007), did not recognise the right to bear arms as a constitutional right, the local firearm registrar shall have discretion over the issuance of a firearm and ammunition licence in accordance with Section 7 and Section 9 of the Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Fireworks, and the Imitation Firearms Act, B.E. 2490 (1947). Without the recognition of the inherent right to bear arms in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007), the rejection order of an application for a licence for a firearm and ammunition shall not be deemed as an administrative order that may affect the rights of the parties in the manner that requires the local firearm registrar to give the parties an opportunity to sufficiently know the facts and to present their evidence opposing thereto before issuing the administrative order according to Section 30 paragraph one of the Administrative Procedure Act, B.E. 2539 (1996). In other words, when the Plaintiff submitted an application for a licence for a firearm and ammunition, the said application did not have any rights as its legal basis; thus, the rejection of firearm licence issuance by the Defendant No. 1 was just as an affirmation of the fact that there was no such right of the Plaintiff to be affected by the administrative proceeding to begin with. Providing that the Plaintiff already acquired five firearms, the Defendant No. 1 lawfully exercised his discretion to reject the issuance of the new licence for the firearm and ammunition on the basis that the firearms in possession of the Plaintiff are deemed to be far beyond necessary for the purpose of defending oneself and one’s properties.
อ่าน 48
อ่านรายละเอียด
One does not simply make a claim of unfair discrimination merely because other wrongdoers went unpunished
The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Defendant No. 1’s orders regarding the Plaintiff’s installation of two signboards, deeming the orders lawful. The Court first ruled the installation of the signboards unlawful, as they violated the Building Control Act, B.E. 2522 (1979) and the relevant Ministerial Regulation. The Court then affirmed that the Defendant No. 1 had acted within its authority. Additionally, the Court rejected the Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendant No. 1 intentionally targeted the Plaintiff, as no action was taken against other instances except the Plaintiff, which constituted an unfair discrimination. In response to this allegation, the Court stated that whether or not the Defendant No. 1 takes enforcement action against violations of the Law on Building Control depends on the particular circumstances and evidence of each case. Moreover, for a claim of unfair discrimination to be valid, one must have a particular legal entitlement that was denied due to discriminatory treatment. Unfair discrimination is not a case where a person, having committed an unlawful act, alleges that other wrongdoers have gone unpunished. Accordingly, the Court ruled the Plaintiff’s claim inadmissible.
อ่าน 45
อ่านรายละเอียด
Negligence and Liability in Road Maintenance State Liability in Road Safety and Traffic Law Compliance
The Department of Highways is the administrative agency responsible for constructing, renovating, and maintaining expressways, national highways, and concession highways to ensure safe, unobstructed travel for road users. Although the Department's failure to provide adequate road lighting constituted a neglect of official duty, the accident was ultimately caused by the injured party’s choice to ride a motorcycle in a restricted traffic lane marked by a prohibition sign. Consequently, the injury was deemed a direct result of the injured party’s own negligence, and the Department of Highways was not found liable for tort against the injured party.
อ่าน 83
อ่านรายละเอียด
Adding an Additional Floor to an Existing Building
Adding a floor to an existing building, regardless of whether it was converted into a two-story, three-story, three-and-a-half-story, or four-story building, was not considered the "Repair" as provided in Section 4 of the Building Control Act, B.E. 2522 (1979). Instead, it fell under the meaning of the “Modification” within the same section of such Act. Consequently, obtaining a “License for Modification” from local officials under the mentioned Act was necessary for adding floors to the building. Failure to obtain such license constituted a violation of the Act. If there was an unauthorized floor addition, it could be rectified without demolishing the entire building. Under Sections 40 and 41 of the Act, a local official had the power to issue orders directing a building owner to stop making alterations to the disputed building, prohibiting him and anyone else from using or entering the building or any modified area, and requiring building owners to make any necessary repairs and to apply for the license for modification within a certain amount of time.
อ่าน 85
อ่านรายละเอียด
‘Considerations Regarding the Protection of Fossils discovered in Mines
The Plaintiffs reside in the vicinity of the Defendant No. 4’s lignite mine, in which mud snail fossils were found. The Defendant No. 1 issued a resolution reserving an 18-rai area within the concession certificate for the conservation of the fossils. The Plaintiffs argued that the 18-rai area was not adequate and filed a case with the Administrative Court, seeking the revocation of the said resolution, the Defendants No. 2 and No. 3 to perform their official duties, and the Defendant No. 4 to cease mining operation and comply with relevant requirements. The Supreme Administrative Court held that as fossils were not “Antiques” by virtue of the Act on Ancient Monuments, Antiques, Objects of Art, and National Museums, B.E. 2504 (1961), the Defendant No. 1 had no legal authority and duty to direct the Fine Arts Department to take part in the examination. The reservation of the fossil area was authorized by the Minerals Act, B.E. 2510 (1967), and the decision was made thoroughly and in accordance with the Principle of Proportionality. Therefore, the Defendant No. 1’s resolution was lawful. The Court held further that the Defendant No. 4’s concession certificate was not issued as a result of a mistake or misunderstanding, and the Defendant No. 4’s operation destroying the fossil beyond the 18-rai area was authorized by the lawful resolution, and did not indicate that the Defendant No. 1 neglected its official duties. Moreover, the matters of EIA were under the responsibility of other agencies, and the Defendant No. 4 had complied with the relevant requirements. Consequently, the Defendants No. 2 and No. 3 did not neglect their official duties either.
อ่าน 97
อ่านรายละเอียด
Disclosure of Information Regarding Asset Concealment Allegations
The Plaintiff requested the Defendant No.1 for documents relating to General Prawit Wongsuwan’s asset concealment allegations, but the Defendant No.1 only provided some of the requested documents stating that the disclosure of other documents was prohibited by law. Despite being ordered by the Information Disclosure Tribunal to disclose the rest of the requested documents to the Plaintiff, the Defendant No.1 insisted that a resolution of the Defendant No.3 was needed to disclose the documents. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the disclosure of information relating to an inquiry which had been concluded would not hinder the conduct of inquiry by the Defendant No.2 or officials of the Defendant No.1 in other ongoing cases based on different allegations. The information that the Plaintiff requested was also a report of facts or information the Defendant No.3 used in making a decision, not an opinion or advice given within the State agency. Thus, the requested information did not fall under Section 15 paragraph one (2) or (3) of the Official Information Act, B.E. 2540 (1997), and can be disclosed. In addition, the decision of the Information Disclosure Tribunal was final according to Section 37 paragraph two of the Official Information Act, B.E. 2540 (1997), and binding on the three Defendants. Consequently, the three Defendants shall disclose the requested documents to the Plaintiff.
อ่าน 158
อ่านรายละเอียด
Reinstatement to the Police Service
The Plaintiff was punished by dismissal for committing a criminal offense, resulting in a final judgment of imprisonment. After being released from prison, he submitted a letter requesting reinstatement to the police service. However, the Plaintiff was considered ineligible due to lacking qualifications and being subject to the prohibitions under Section 48 (6) of the Royal Thai Police Act, B.E. 2547 (2004) in accordance with Rule 2 paragraph one (4) of the Regulation of the Police Commission on Qualifications and Prohibited Characteristics for Being a Police Official, B.E. 2547 (2004). To return to the police service, the Plaintiff needed unanimous votes from the members of the Defendant No. 1 to exempt him from disqualifications according to Rule 2 paragraph two of the said Regulation. When the vote was not unanimous, the Defendant No. 2 could not reinstate the Plaintiff to the police service. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the legality of the Defendant No. 1’s resolution and affirmed the judgment of the Administrative Court of First Instance, which dismissed the case.
อ่าน 169
อ่านรายละเอียด

ข้อมูลทั้งหมด 125 รายการ
แสดงข้อมูล
รายการต่อหน้า
  • หน้า 1/13


เขตอำนาจศาลปกครองเขตอำนาจศาลปกครอง
ศาลปกครอง
สืบค้นข้อมูล
บริการประชาชน